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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GAIL ElILLINGS, et al., 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. Case No. 17336 
STANLEY T. FARLEY' et al.' 
Defendants and Appellants. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The plaintiffs brought this action seeking to enforce 
the payment provisions of their respective contracts with the 
defendants for the purchase and sale of the plaintiffs' tart 
cherries in 1973. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The lower court determined that the defendants had agreed 
to pay certain of the plaintiffs the same price that a competitor 
of the defendants, Muir-Roberts Company, paid for tart cherries 
in 1973, 21-1/2 cents per pound, and that the other plaintiffs 
were entitled to be paid a reasonable price of 21-1/2 cents per 
f.'OUnd for their cherries. The lower court accordingly granted 
judament to the individual plaintiffs for the difference between 
the price paid by Muir-Roberts for similarly graded cherries and 
the price paid by the defendants. The court also found that the 
defendants Baum and Farley operated as partners and thus held the 
cie'f"nclant Stanley T. Farley jointly liable to the plaintiffs. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The plaintiffs respectfully request that the judgment 
the lower court be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Prior to 1973 Garn L. and Peggy Baum owned real esta~E 
Utah County on which was located a fruit processing pl:r, 
Before 1973 they operated a business which processed sweet 
tart cherries, apples, and other fruits. 'l'he Baums lost mane) 
the fruit processing business in the years 1970, 1971, and Jr 
By 1973 they had accumulated business losses for those Yb 
totalling $271,513.00. By July 1973 they were insolvent. 
240). 
Garn Baum had, in accordance with the statutes of the S:· 
of Utah, furnished a bond in 1971 to guarantee payment of dE:· 
wllich he incurred as a produce dealer 1 icensed by the Stat; 
Utah. Baum had defaulted in the payment of his debts a: 
produce dealer and his surety was called upon to honor its tc' 
In July of 1973 the Baums owed unpaid debts of at least $142.: 
During the fruit harvesting and processing season of 1973 Garr 
Baum did not have and could not have obtained the surety: 
necessary to do business as a produce dealer in the Stat' 
Utah. ( R. 241). 
Prior to July 197 3 the land which the Baums had c 
was foreclosed upon by the Bank of American Fork, a bcr: 
corporation of the State of Utan. On July 10, 1973 tr,e l;r 
-2-
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processing plant which previously was owned by the Baums was 
owned by the Bank of American Fork. On or about July 10, 1973, 
the aank of American Fork sold the fruit processing plant and 
land which had previously been owned by the Baums to the brother-
in-law and sister of Garn L. Baum, Stanley T. and Ora B. Farley. 
( R. 241) . 
The Baums and Farleys had an unwritten agreement that the 
1::$aums had an option to purchase from the Farleys the land and 
equipment which the Farleys had purchased from the Bank of 
American Fork. The Baums and the Farleys deliberately refrained 
from putting the Baums' option in writing because they feared 
that oaums' creditors might be able to reach tLe property if the 
Baums had it in their name. (R. 241-242). 
·On July 10, 1973 a letter, plaintiffs' Exhibit 2, was 
addressed to fruit growers in Utah County and was mailed through 
the United States Mail. The letter bore the name Garn L. Baum as 
well as the name Fantasy Fruits. Exhibit 2 stated, "Through help 
of Ora and Stanley T. Farley, this processing plant will be 
operating this year." It also stated, "Fantasy Fruits is the 
name of the company who will purchase your cherries. Fantasy 
Fruits is owned by Stanley T. Farley, Orem, iJtah." (R. 242). 
Part of the "help" that Ora and Stanley T. Farley gave was 
to use their property of an agreed value of $125,000 as a down 
payment on the purchase of the property from the Bank of American 
F~rk, to furnish a surety bonc1, anc obtain a license from the 
-3-
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State of Utah and the United States Department of Agricultur: 
that the processing plant could operate and so that Fan'; 
Fruits could purchase produce from persons such as the PL 
tiffs. (R. 242). 
Muir-Roberts is a partnershiJ? which does business o: 
commission merchant in Utah. Prior to 1973 Muir-Roberts and c, 
L. Baum had been competitors in purchasing fruit from the f:. 
producers of Utah County. Muir-Roberts competed with Far.:: 
Fruits in 1973. The treasurer of Muir-Roberts testifieo ,: 
Muir-Roberts paid for tart cherries in 1973 according t'. 
graded scale. The tart cherries purchased by Muir-Roberts 
graded by Federal inspectors. Huir-Rooerts paid 21-1/2 cent': 
pound for cherries which graded 97% or better. Fantasy Fnr 
cherries were also graded by Federal inspectors. Fantasy Fro. 
paid on a graded scale of 15 cents per pound for cherries gr; 
95% and better. The pr ice paid by both i'iuir-Roberts and Fane' 
Fruits was reduced as the quality of the cherries declined. 
242-243). 
The plaintiffs Merrill Gappmeyer, Paul Hansen, andc' 
Gillman, a partner in Gil lrnan Brothers, were promised oy '· 
be.um that Fantasy Fruits would pay as n1uct: for tne tart che': 
purchased from them as 11.uir-Roberts paid for tart cherries 
it purchased. The plaintiffs Fobert Gail Sillings anci ,,: 
Gillman 11ere not quoted a firm i:-rice, but expected to be a; .. 
11 good" · - t.r'.e de I'2:10ants. price frorr. rej'.lresentat1ons maoe by 
I 
........... 
1 
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agreed contract pr ice between Fantasy Fruits and Merrill Gapp-
nieyer, Paul Hansen, and Gillman Brothers was 21-1/2 cents per 
round on a graded scale of 97%. The reasonable contract price of 
cherries sold by Earley Gillman and Robert Gail Billings to 
fantasy Fruits was 21-1/2 cents per pound on a gradeci scale of 
97%. (H. 244-245). 
The rr,anager of Payson Fruit Growers Association testified 
that that association sold processed cherries for 35 cents per 
[JOUnd, Garn L. Baum testified that Fantasy Fruits sold the 
oroces~.erl ch<0rr ies for 35 cents per puuno and that ~iuir Roberts 
sold the cherries for 35 cents per pound. The money 
growers of cherries by Fantasy Fruits was 
money which was received by fantasy fruits from the sale of 
tnat was 
processed 
pa id to 
cherries such as those delivered by the :c:ilaintiffs to Fantasy 
fruitc.. TLe growers had to wait for payment until Fantasy Fruits 
sold the cherries and recieved payment there fer. The cost of 
'c'rocessing the tart ct.erries of the Payson Fruit Growers Asso-
ciation which included receivina the cherries, pitting them, 
adding sugar in the customary manner, putting them in containers, 
the cc.st of tr.e containers and inclL:ding also ciepreciation of 
'·13r.t o;nd equipment anc' interest on the investrrer.i: of plant and 
equipment, was 7.8 cents per pound. Garn Baum testified that the 
Fantasy Fruit operation was mere efficient than the operation of 
ti.e ?ayscn t"rui t Growers. Thus, at the agreea purcnase price of 
- ... J cents pr::r f-C'urci, tc:-.ntasy Fruits had a profit on its opera-
-5-
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41 
tion for processing cherries, before any costs of selling, sf 
cents per pound or $114.00 per ton. (R. 243, 245). 
AP.GUMENT 
POINT I 
INASMUCH AS THE EVIDENCE REGARDING THE CONTRACT 
PRICE TO BE PAID THE PLAINTIFFS DCES NOT CLEARLY 
PREPONDERATE AGAINST THE FINL>INGS OF THE TRIAL 
COURT, THIS COURT MUST UPHOLD THOSE FINDINGS. 
The plaintiffs are proceeding in equity to enforce: 
payment provisions of their respective sales agreements wltr: 
defendants. Although the appeal of an equitable proceec: 
permits a review of both the facts and the law, a findi~ oft. 
may be rejected only if the evidence "clearly preponderat;. 
against the finding made by the trial court. Ryan v. Earl,' 
P. 2d 54 (Utah 1960). In Ovard v. Cannon, 600 P. 2d 1246, J.. 
(Utah 1979), the court stated: 
It is true that in cases of equity this court may 
weigh the evidence and determine the facts. 
However, it is well established in our decisional 
law that due to the advantaged position of the 
trial court, there is indulged a presumption of 
correctness of the findings ano judgment; and 
that where the evidence may conflict we do not 
upset the lower court's findings unless the 
evidence clearly proponderates against them. 
(Emphasis in original). 
Likewise, Knight v. Leigh, 619 P. 2d 1385, 1387 (Utah 1 ~' 
held that "[t)he court will not reverse a decision of a 
court on issues of fact c,lone when there is sufficient ev:o:· 
to support the decision of the trial court." 
The defendants contend that there is no evidence to,: 
-6-
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a contract price of 21-1/2 cents per pound for tart cherries 
between the plaintiffs and the defendants. The defendants' brief 
summarizes the testimony of the plaintiffs, but it fails to 
include testimony which supports the plaintiffs' position. For 
example, Merrill Gappmeyer testified as follows: 
Q You and Garn had these conversations. 
A That's right. 
Q As to the tart cherries or the sour cherries, 
did you arrive at any price with him? Did you 
arrive at the price that he would pay you? 
A That he would pay me? 
Q The price that he would pay you for the sour 
cherries? 
A No. The only conversations that we had as to 
a final pr ice that I would be paid, was that I 
would be paid what anybody else was paid. 
0 Did you mention Muir-Roberts at all? 
A Yes. 
Q And in what context was that mentioned? 
A Just in the normal discussion that, "I'll pay 
as well as Muir-Roberts or any of the other 
processors." 
(Trial transcript pp. 14-15). 
\'lhen cross-examined by counsel for defendants Baum, Mr. Gappmeyer 
testified: 
Q You have indicated that Baum told you he would 
do as well as others? 
A That's correct. 
C That is, not only Muir-Roberts, but other 
processors, as well? 
A The standard answer that I received in mul-
tiple conversations with him was, "Don't worry 
about it. I'll do just as well as anyone else." 
One reason that I was concerned is because I knew 
what the potential was. 
Q i'.nd you took that to mean that he would do as 
well as Nuir-Roberts? 
.; \<Jell, he specifically said as well as Muir-
Poberts in one conversation. 
l''ri3l transcript pp. 24-25). 
-7-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Paul Hansen testified on direct examination as follows,, 
regard to conversations with Garn Baum: 
Q What was said? 
A well we just negotiated on the cherries. r 
had been se 11 ing most of them to Muir-Roberts, 
and he [Garn Baum] wanted the cherries, and I 
told him I would bring him some. And he said 
that he would pay what the others was going to 
pay. 
Q Did he make any reference to Muir-Roberts as 
to what he would pay or what Muir-Koberts had 
paid? 
A No, not as such. 
Q What did he say? 
A He just said that he would "meet him or beat 
him," is what he said. 
(Trial Transcript pp. 38-39). Robert Gail Billings ther. 
testified on direct examination: 
Q Did you have any conversation with him [Garn 
Ba um] at the time as to the [Jr ice that you would 
be paid? 
A I think I asked something about, "How does the 
price look, and he said, "It looks very good." 
Q Did he quote you a price? 
A Not at all. 
(Trial transcript pp. 46-47). On redirect ex am i nation, 
Billings explained his reason for joining this lawsuit. 
i•ly reasonin<J on deciding to get into this 
lawsuit went like this: I felt that when rny 
fruit is consigned to a buyer that doesn't quote 
me a fixed price, he should do the very best tnat 
he can in allowina the marketing considerations; 
and the fact other buyers paic a significantly 
higher price, I think that five cents ( .05 cents) 
a pound is thirty-three ( 33%) nigher than he 
paid. I felt that he must not have been paying 
~e the best that he could have paid. 
(Trial transcript, p. 50). 
-8-
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r 
Mr. Harley Gillman explained that in his prior dealings with 
the 5aums, they had paid very close to what other processors 
paid. He then testified: 
Q 5ut as to yourself, you don't remember being 
quoted a firm price? 
A No, not a firm price, unless Mr. Black is 
construing this letter as a firm price, because 
that figure nas been kicked around. 
Q Did you construe that letter as being a firm 
price? 
A No, I did not construe that letter as being a 
firm price. No. 
Q So from your past dealings with Mr. Baum, you 
felt that he would pay equal to what the other 
processors would pay? 
A Yes. 
Finally, Mr. Dean Gillman testified for Gillman Brothers as 
follows: 
Q Now, did you have any conversation at all with 
Mr. Farley or Mr. Baum as to the price you would 
receive in 1973? 
A No, sir. Not before we took our cherries over 
there. I talked to neither one of them. 
v All right. Did you have a conversation after 
you took your cherries over there? 
A Yes. 
I.! Tell us when you had the first conversation, 
who was present and the approximate time? 
A Well, I would think it was the first or second 
load of cherries taken over there. I can't 
remember when it was, exactly. But I visited 
with Garn many times. I visited with him many 
times. He told me not to worry, that things 
looked good. He said, "If I can't make it this 
year, I'll never make it again. It looJ<s that 
good." He told me that. fie says, "Don't you 
worry," he says, "Ill pay you as much as Muir-
Roberts." So we was happy, and we just kept 
taking our cherries to him. 
Q How many times did he tell you that? 
A Well, iie assured me of that many times, that 
there was nothina to worry about. 
Q Had you sold ~herries to him prior? 
-9-
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A It could be that we sold to him in '71, and 
maybe we sold him a few in '68. There is three 
times, I thin!<, that we sold to him. But that's 
all. 
Q Were you ever quoted a firm pr ice during the 
other year? 
A Not to my knowledge. 
(Trial transcript p. 67). 
Q What w~re you told? 
A I was told that we had no worries, that we 
would be paid as much as Muir-Roberts was paying. 
Q And how many times were you told that? 
A Many. Many times. 
(Trial transcript p. 74). 
Mr. Greenwell, accounting supervisor and Secretary-Treas: 
for Muir-Roberts Company, testified that Muir-Roberts,, 
21-1/2 cents per pound for tart cherries graded 97% to 11> 
(Trial transcript p. 108). Based on the scale that t\uir-Rote: 
paid, the court entered judgment in favor of Merrill Gappie; 
Paul Hansen, Gail Billings, liarley Gillman, and Gillman Bret· 
based on the difference between the graded scale paid bi· 
defendants and the graded scale paid by Muir-Roberts. 
234). 
Although the testimony of Garn Baum conflicted with tho: 
the plaintiffs, the court chose to believe the testimonv of 
plaintiffs to the effect that Mr. Bau!l' represented that far 
Fruits would meet or beat the price paid by Muir-Roberts. 
defendants do not cnallenge the lower court's decisicn •: 
matter of law, but argue that the evidence was ins~ifilC 
to support it. The lengthy recitation above Cierrun5trate 
-10-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
there is substantial evidence supporting the existence of a 
contract price equal to or better than that paid by Muir-Roberts. 
Therefore, this court should not reverse the lower court's 
decision inasmuch as there is sufficient evidence to support it. 
Knignt v. Leigh, supra. 
In Keesling v. Basamakis, 539 P. 2d 1043 (Utah 1975), the 
court explained the importance of the advantaged position of the 
trial court in weighing the credibility of witnesses in situa-
tions of conflicting evidence. 
Plaintiff produced evidence tending to prove 
the existence of a partnership. Defendant 
produced opposing evidence and further produced 
evidence which tended to prove a joint venture of 
the nature heretofore described. The trial 
court, exercising its prerogative as a trier of 
fact in a nonjury case, weighed the credibility 
of the witnesses, and was not persuaded by 
plaintiff's evidence. This court will not 
disturb such a determination when reasonable men 
could differ as to the weight to be given to 
conflicting evidence. 
539 P. 2d at 1046. Accordingly, the judgment of the lower court 
should be affirmed. 
POINT II 
NEITHER STATE NOR FEDERAL LAW PRECLUDES THE 
ENFORCEMENT OF THE PLAINTIFFS' CONTRACTS WITH THE 
DEFENDANTS. 
The defendants' contention that both state and federal 
law precluGe the enforcement of the defendants' contracts to 
pay ['rices equal to Muir-Roberts is simply without merit. Even 
if ~2nt3sy ~ruits is a produce dealer as opposed to a commission 
-11-
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merchant, there is no provision in Utah statutory or ca" 
which prohibits a price agreement which relates to payments_ 
by third persons. Utah Code Annotated § 5-1-2, in effect dur. 
1973, provided that a dealer was any person except a commiso. 
merchant and except a person who pays for farm products;: 
receiving possession of them, who for the purpose of re;, 
obtains possession of farm products from the producer. It: 
not prohibit a dealer from taking possession of farm produw: 
determining a price to be paid therefor at a future date. 
Likewise, federal law did not preclude a contract price 
21-1/2 cents per pound. The pr ice freeze which the defer.co .. 
refer to so assiduously was enacted by President Nixc,, 
Executive Order No. 11723 on June 13, 1973. U. S. Code Cone:' 
sional and Administrative News, 1973, p. 3496. Section' 
that order states that "[t]he provisions of this order shall· 
extend to the prices charged for raw agricultural produ:: 
Clearly, then, there was no federal 1 imitation to the C' 
which the defendants could pay to the plaintiff growero 
their tart cherries. President Nixon's Executive Crder l. 
dated July 18, 1973, removed the pr ice freeze on food (exce~· 
beef) established by Executive Order 11723. See u. 5. 
Cong. & Admin. }iews, 1973, p. 3506. The plaintiffs requlo:. 
court pursuant to Rule 9, Utah Rules of Evidence, cc 
· 1 · f - t. o a ,- 11723 ana· 11no. judic1a notice o ~xecu ive r er ~os. 
Ex e cut iv e Ord e r s a pp e a r in the i r en t ire t y i r, tr." ':< 
-12-
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hereto. 
Accordingly, neither state nor federal law precluded the 
enforcement of a contract pr ice of 21-1/2 cents per pound of tart 
cherries. 
POINT III 
THE FARLEYS ARE JOINTLY LIABLE TO THE PLAIN-
TIFFS WHETHJ:.:R IT t;E BY PRINCIPLES OF PART'NERSHIP, 
AGSNCY, OR ESTOPPEL. 
The defendants' final argument is that there is neither a 
9artnership nor agency relationship between the defendants Baum 
ana the defendc:nts Farley as a matter of law. Apparently, the 
defendants' basis for this conclusion is this court's decision in 
r;oesling v. Basamakis, supra, and the Arizona case of ~er~~ 
Rollette, 439 P. 2d 497 (Ariz. 1968). However, neither of these 
cases is applicable to the facts of the present case. 
anc Myer~ involved disputes arr:onc; partners. The intention of the 
alleged partners is controlling only when third parties are not 
involved. 0yers v. Rollete, supra. 
\ihether or not a partnership existeo is not the critical 
auestion in this case. The only important question is whether or 
re~ ~~e defendants Farley should be held liable on the contracts 
~ith the plaintiffs. In this regard, Utah Cece Annotated § 40-1-1 
et. seq. is determinative. Section 48-1-3 defines partnership as 
''an association of two or more persons to carry en as cc-owners a 
.cusinf'SS for profit." The court found that the "Farley's action 
~ ~c?ljing for the licenses and bond reauired to do business anc 
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the representations that they were operators of Fantasy Fn'. 
and in signing the checks of the company, they were partner, 
and are jointly 1 iaole with the Baums to the plaintiffs herci· 
(R. 235). T·hese facts constitute the defendants as co-owner' 
a business for profit. Furthermore, the defendants acknow1, 
in their brief that the Baums and farleys did share profit' 
some extent. 
In any event, U.C.A. § 48-1-13 provides for the liabilit; 
one who is held out as a partner even though in fact he is ri~: 
partner. 
48-1-13 Partner by estoppel.--(1) When a 
person by words spoken or written or by conduct 
represents himself, or consents to another's 
representing him, to anyone as a partner, in an 
existing partnership or with one or more persons 
not actual partners, he is liable to any such 
person to whom such representation has been made 
who has on the faith of such representation given 
credit to the actual or apparent partnership, 
and, if he has made such representation or 
consented to its being 1nad e in a pub 1 ic manner, 
he is liable to such person, whether the repre-
sentation has or has not been made or communi-
cated to such person so giving credit by, or with 
the knowledge of, the apparent partner making the 
representation or consentin9 to its being made. 
(a) Vihen a partnership liability results, he 
is 1 iable as if he were an actual mend::er of toe 
partnership, 
(b) When no partnership liability results, he 
is liable jointly with the other persons, if any, 
so consenting to the contract or representation 
as to incur liability; otherwise,. separetely. 
( 2) \.-Jhen a person has been thus represented 
to be a partner in an existino partnership, or 
11ith one or rr.ore persons r.ot actual partners, he 
is an aoent of the persons consenting to such 
represen-tai::ion to bind tneIT' to the same exter.t 
and in the same ;;-,anner as thouch he were a 
-14-
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partner in fact, with respect to persons who rely 
upon the representation. Where all the members 
of an existing partnership consent to the repre-
sentation, a partnership act or obligation results; 
but in all other cases it is the joint act or 
obligation of the person acting and the persons 
consenting to the representation. 
Furthermore, there can be no doubt that Fantasy Fruits was 
owned at least in part by Mr. Farley. Exhibit 2 expressly states 
that "Fantasy Fruits is the name of the company who will purchase 
your cherries. Fantasy Fruits is owned by Stanley T. Farley, 
Orem, lltah." Whatever else may have been the relationship 
between the Baums and the Farleys, it is clear that Mr. Farley 
was an owner of Fantasy Fruits and that the Baums acted on behalf 
of Fantasy Fruits. The plaintiff growers relied on the backing 
of Mr. Farley in bringing their cherries to Fantasy Fruits. Mr. 
Farley is therefore jointly liable to the plaintiffs regardless 
of whether or not there was an actual partnership or agency 
relationship. See 2A C.J.S. Agency ~§ 56-61. 
CONCLUSION 
The facts as founa by the trial court are sufficient to 
establish the existence of valid contracts between the plaintiffs 
an6 the defendants for the sale and purchase of the plaintiffs' 
~art cherries for the price of 21-1/2 cents per pound, according 
to the scale paid by Muir-Roberts Company. The enforcement of 
this contract is not precluaed by either state or federal law. 
TGc evidence also establishes the existence of a partnershir 
cr,t· "er t:ie defenc2.nts Baum anc' Farley and that the Farleys ~re 
-15-
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jointly liable for the amounts owed to the plaintiffs ner; 
Therefore, the plaintiffs respectfully request that· 
court affirm the judgment of the lower court . 
Dated: March .:.; ' i 9 81. 
-~---
Respectfully submitted, 
.,/_c'wc,,1,,;;,,._/z../ ::/t•-(<,,r · 
DALLAS H. YGUNG, JR·./·-7----
tlAILING CERTIFICATE 
Mailed two copies of F.espondents' 5r ief, postac;e prep: 
to Robert N. ~ic.cri, attorney for appella[l~ 738 Scutn :, 
East , Sa 1 t Lake C i t y , U t ah 8 4 1 O 2 th is _ _/.£_:::___ day of ; ;c: 
1981. 
LALLAS h. YOUNG, JR. 
0 , 
-_!.Q-
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EXECl'TffE ORDERS 
No. 11 i22 
June 12, 1973. 38 F.R. 1543i 
INSPECTION OF INCO~!E. ESTATE. AND GIFT TAX RETCR:-.:s BY 
THE COMMITTEE ON 1:--;TERNAL SECURITY. HOUSE 
OF REPRESENTATIVES 
By virtue of the authority Yested in me by section 6103(aJ of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 195-J. as amended 1.::!6 e.sc. 6103!a1),ti1 it 
is hereby ordered that any income. estate, or gift tax return for the years 
1964 to 19i4, inclusi\·e. shall. during the :\inety-third Congress. be open 
to inspection by the Committee on Internal Security, House of Repre-
sentatives, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof. for the purpose 
of carrying on those investigations authorized by clause 11 of Rule XI 
of the Rules of the House of Representati\·es Such inspection shall be 
in accordance and upon compliance with th€' rules and regulations pre-
scribed by the Secretary of the Treasury in Treasury Decision ~132. re-
lating to the inspection of returns by coma11ttees of thP Congress. ap-
proved by the President on ~fay 3, 1955 
THE \YmTE Hol-sE, 
June 9. 1978. 
No. lli23 
June 15, 1973, 38 F.R. 15765 
RICHARD :\"rxox. 
Fl'RTHER PROVIDING FOR THE STAB!LIZATIO;-.; 
OF THE ECO!\'OMY 
On January 11, 1973 I issued Executive Order 11695 1:::: which pro,·id-
ed for establishment of Phase III of the Economic Stabilization Program 
On April 3 0. 19 i 3 the Congress enacted, and I signed into law. amend-
ments to the Economic Stabilization Act of 19 j() r.3 which extended for 
one year. until April 3n. 1974. lhe !egislati,·e authority for carrying out 
the Economic Stabilization Program 
During Phase III. labor and management have contributed to our sta-
bilization efforts through responsible collecth·e bargaining. The Amer-
ican people look to labor and management to continue their constructi\"e 
and cooperative contributions. Price beha,·ior under Phase III has cot 
been satisfactory, howe,·er. I ha\"e therefore determined to impose a 
cornprehensiYe freeze for a maximum period of 60 days on the prices of 
all commodities and ser\"ices offered for sale except the prices charged for 
raw agricultural products. I ha\"e determined that this action is neces-
sary to stabilize the economy, reduce inflation, minimize unernp!oyment, 
improve the :-..·auon ·s competitiYe position in world trade and protect the 
purchasing power of the dollar. all in the context of sound fiscal manage-
ment and effective monetary policies. 
:'\iO\V, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority Yested in we by the 
Constitution and statutes of the Cnited Stares, particularly the Economic 
Stabilization Act of 19i11, as amended, it is hereby ordered as follows 
Section 1 Effective 9 rin p. m .. e. s. t.. June 13, 19i3, no seller may 
charge to any class of purchaser and no purchaser may pay a price for 
any commodity or service which exceeds the freeze price charged for the 
same or a similar corumoditr or serYice in transactions with the same 
61. 2G (IR C.l954J § 6l03(al 63. l~ 1· :-; (_' _\ ~ 191.1-I nott' 
62. l".S Code Cong & Adm ~e\\ s 
p 3471 
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EXECl'TIVE ORDERS 
class cf purchaser during the freeze base period. This order shall be 
eftectin' for a maximum period of 6fi days from the date hereof. until 
11 59 P m., e. s. t. August 12, 1973. It is not unlawful to charge or 
pay a price le~s than the freeze price and lower prices are encouraged. 
Sec. 2 Each seller shall prepare a list of freeze prices for all com-
modities and sernces which he sells and shall maintain a copy of that list 
arn1lable for public inspection. durini: normal business hours, at each 
place of business where such commodities or services are offered for sale. 
In addition. the calculations and supporting data upon which the list is 
based shall be maintained by the seller at the location where- the pricing 
decisions reflected on the list are ordinarily made and shall be made 
a\ai!ahle on request to representati\·es of the Economic Stabilization 
Program 
Sec. :l The pro\'is1ons of this order shall not e;..Lend to the prices 
charged for raw agricultural products The prices of processed agricul-
tural products. howeYer. are subject to the pro\'is1ons of this order. For 
thosE- agricultural products which are sold for U)[imate consumption in 
their original unprocessed form. this proYision applies after the first salf'.' 
Sec 4 The pro\·isions of this order do not extend to (al wages and 
salaries. which continue to be subject to the program established pur-
suant to Executh·e Order 11695(b1 interest and dh·idends. which con-
tinue to be subject to the program established by the Committee on 
!nteresf and DiYidends and (Cl rents which continue to be subject to 
controls only to the limited extent pro,·ided in ExecutiYe Order 111)95. 
Sec. 5. The Cost of LiYing Council shall de,·eJop and recommend to 
the President policies, mechanisms and procedures to achieYe· and main-
tain stability of prices and costs in a growing economy after the expira-
tion of this freeze. To this end, it shall consult with representati\·es of 
agriculture. industry, labor. consumers and the public. 
Seic. 6 (a 1 Executi\·e Order 11695 continues to remain in full force 
and effect and the authority conferred by and pursuant to this ordf'r 
shall be in addition to the author1tr conferred by or pursuant to E.-.:ecu-
t1·;;:- Order 11695 including authorit:r to grant exceptions and exemptions 
under ~~·J'ropriate standards issued pursuant to regulations. 
1b1 All power:s and duties delegated to the Chairman of the Cost of 
Llnng Council by Executfye Order 11695 for the purpose of carryinc: 
out the pro,·isions of that order are hereby delegated to the Chairman of 
the Cosr of Lh·ing Council for the purpose of carrying out the pro,·isions 
of this order. 
Sec. 7 \\'hoeYer willfully violates this order or any order or regula-
tion contrn ued or issued under authoritv of this order sha!l be subject to 
a fine of not more than $5,000 for each .such dolation. 'Yhoe,·er Yiolates 
1his order or any order or regulation continued or issued under authority 
of this order shall be subject to a ciYil penalty of not more than $2,5i'l4l 
for each such Yiolation. 
Sec. 8 For purposes of this Executi\·e Order. the followin? defini-
t!ons apply· 
''Freeze price" means the highest prict> at or abo\·e which at least 11 1 
percent of the commodities or services concerned were priced by the 
seller in transactions with the class of purchaser concerned during the 
freeze base period. In computing the freeze price, a seller may not 
E-xclude any temporary special sale, deat or allowance in effect durin~ 
thtt freeze base period 
"Class of purchaser" means all those purchasers to whom a seller has 
charc- ... rl a comparable price for comparable commodities or services dur· 
in,e; the freeze base penod pursuant to customary price differentials be-
t"" e ... n those purchasers and other purchasers 
"F'reeze base period" means 
i a 1 thf" period June 1 to June 8. 19';'::'.; or 
3497 
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EXECUTIVE ORDERS 
(bl In the case of a seller \vho had no transactions during that period 
the nearest preceding seven-day period in which he had a transaction. 
"Transaction" means an arms length sale between unrelated persons 
and is considered to occur at the time of shipment in the case of coni-
modities and the time of performance in the case of sernces 
HJCHARD Xrx0,·. 
June 13, 197;3. 
3498 
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EXECUTIVE ORDERS 
No. lli30 
July 19. 1973. 38 F.R. 19345 
Ft:RTHER PROVIDI:'>G FOR THE STABILIZATION 
OF THE ECO:-<O~IY 
On June 13, 1973. I ordered a freeze for a maximum period of 60 
days on the prices of all commodities anrJ services offered for sale except 
the prices charged for raw agricultural products. At that time. I stated 
that the freeze period ~·ould be used to de\elop a new and more effecti\·e 
system or controls to follow the freeze. Planning for the Phase IV pro-
gram has proceeded rapidly and I ha\·e. therefore. decided that the freeze 
on food. except for bfef, should be remo\·ed and more flexible controls 
substlluted in a two-stage process in the food industry. The first stage 
wiil be effective at 4 u11 p. m .. e. s. t., July 18. 1973. The freeze in other 
secrors of the economy will continue through August 12. 1973. I am 
also directing the Cost of Linng Council to publish for comment now. 
proposed plans for Phase IV controls in other sectors of the economy I 
ha\-e determined that this action is necessary to stabilize the economy, 
reduce mflation. minimize un'emptoyruent. iruproYe the :\'ation's coru-
petiti\e position in world trade and protect the purchasing power of the 
dollar. all in the context of sound fiscal management and effecti,·e mone-
t::i.ry policies. 
:\"O\\·, THEREFORE, by Yirtue of the authority \'ested in me by the 
Constnution and statutes of the enited States. particula"rlY the Economic 
Stabilization Act of l 9ir1.'.:I as amended. it is hereby ordered as follows: 
Section 1. ExecutiYe Order 11'723 l<i establishing a freeze on prices 
tffective 9:0f1 p. m. e. s. t., June 13. 1973, for a maximum period of 6L1 
days 1s hereby superseded except as hereinafter proyided. Under the pro-
nsions of E:-..ecu ti\·e Order 11695,11 the freeze regulations issued by the 
Cost of Li\·ing Council. pursuant to the authority of Executi\·e Order 
lli23 remain in effect except as the Chairman of the Cost of Living 
Council may modify them. The price freeze established by ExecutiYe 
Order lli'2~ remains in effect until 11:59 p. m., e. s. t., August 12. 1973, 
e:-..cept to the extent the Chairman of the Cost of Lh·ing Council mar 
modify it 
Sec 2. Ali orders. regularions. circulars. rulings, notices or other 
directin·s issued and all other actions taken by any agency pursuant to 
E_,ecuti\-e Order 11723. and in effect on the date of this order are hereby 
confirmed and ratified. and shail remain in full force and effect unless 
or until altered. amended. or re\·oked by the Chairman of the Cost of 
LJ\·ing Council. 
Sec. 3. This order shall not operate to defeat any suit, action, prose-
cution. or admlnistratiYe proceeding. whether heretofore or hereafter 
commenced. with respect to any right possessed, liability incurred, or 
qffense committed prior to this date. 
Sec. 4. Executive Order 11695 continues to remain in full force and 
.:-ffect 
THE "'HITE HorsE, 
July 18. 1978. 
Rrcx..um Xrxox. 
9. 12 L" SC A. ~ 19n.-1 note 11. 1973 t.r.S Code Cong. & Adm.Xew9 
10. 1973 L. S.Code Cong. & Adm.:-;'ews p. 34jL 
p 3496 
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